

PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AFRICA UNION'S (AU): CHALLENGES OF AFRICA STANDBY FORCE (ASF) IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

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ABSTRACT

The African Union (AU) was established by Constitutive Act and through its 2002 Protocol on the establishment of a continental peace and security architecture which include the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, a Peace Fund and the African Stand-by Force. This was aimed at promoting peace, security and stability, and protection of “human and people’s rights”, among others. The Great Lakes Region since the 1994 Rwandan genocide which shocked the international community and the rest of world has witnessed ravaging wars, atrocities and devastation loss of lives. More than 4 million people have died as a result of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone. The East Africa Stand-by force (EASF) was established in 2007 by defense ministers from 13 countries to be used in peacekeeping missions to respond to national emergencies.

According to the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism the East African stand by force (EASF) was to go operational in November 2010 after the Standby Brigade, which was undergoing field training, as by the requirements set by the African Union. However the countries around the Great Lakes region have been under the gush of civil conflicts that have left tens of thousands of people homeless or displaced as refugees. The instability in the region has centered on countries such as DRC, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic. The conflicts within the region have gone unabated even with the presence of the international bodies like the UN, AU, peacekeepers, among others. This paper discusses the role of Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the East Africa Standby Force, as well as the challenges they face in dealing with conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.

KEYWORDS: Security, Peacekeeping, Conflicts Africa, Architecture, AU, UN, APSA, PSC, ASF, Great Lakes

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War marked a period of many intra –state conflicts not only in Africa but also in the rest of the world which occurred in the countries seeking independence and sovereignty (Dersso, 2010). Several factors were responsible for the many protracted conflicts which have continued to characterize the continent of Africa which include the legacy of the colonial masters who arbitrarily drew the boundaries irrespective of the communities, their families and communities ended up being members of different countries, leading to interstate conflicts, as witnessed in Ethiopia and Eritrea over territorial boundary. The Great Lakes Region of Africa has been a melting pot for most of the colonial masters such as Germany, Great Britain and Belgium, with differing ideologies from those of the African communities, leading to conflict. The struggle also for scarce natural resources, power domination ethnicity, authoritarian regimes, weak governance, lack of transparency and corruption are some of the factors that are responsible for conflicts in the continent (Journal on peace 2010, Dersso, 2010; Vines 2013). The African continent has been therefore a major focus of the UN Security Council over the last 50 years due frequent occurrence of conflicts and wars and high levels of killings where millions of people have lost their lives). The African continent also has faced constant threat from insurgent groups such as Al-Shabaab, LRA, Al-Qaeda (Vines A., 2013; African Union, 2013).

The Post -Cold War period is a time when the African States experienced insurgency and insecurity leading them to consider forming a united front to fight off these external threats. This condition saw the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 with the aim of among others, to translate the “determination into dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security that must be established and maintained” (OAU Charter, preamble, 1963) however, the principles in the Article 3 (2) states: “Non-interference in the affairs of state and (4) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiations, mediation, conciliation or arbitration”. This restricted the response by OAU to any intra-conflict, yet peace and security was the agenda to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Countries in Africa were getting threatened with insecurity and yet the UN was not quick to respond to the threats (IPSTC 2011). The Western countries at the same time had developed cold feet and were not willing to help Africans come out of conflict, with the claim that there is a policy which states “African solutions to African problems”. This meant that the international organizations, the UN and the OAU were not able to respond in time to save the countries experiencing intra conflicts. For Instance, Somalia in 1991, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where more than 4million died as a result of conflict, and the shocking genocide of the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994, which took place in the full view of the whole world where people were massacred with no intervention from the international organization, in The Greta Lakes Region, the African countries and the rest of the world (Vines, A, 2013). African have the responsibility of solving the problems in the continent, as Mandela put it:

“Africa is beyond bemoaning the past for its problems and; that the task of undoing the past is ours, with the support of those willing to join us in a continental renewal. We have a new generation of leaders who know that we must take responsibility for our own destiny.”

—Nelson Mandela

There was therefore a need to establish a body that is capable of responding the conflicts in the African continent, to save the continent from future scourge of war and related crimes and insecurity. The response was the establishment of African Union (AU) according to the provisions of by Constitutive Act of African Union (AU) (Article 2) which was adopted in Lome, Togo in 11July 2000 and entered into force on 26th May 2001. The AU inaugural meeting was held in Durban South Africa in July, 2002, which saw a shift from “non-interference” approach of OAU, to intervention in Article 4(h) which provides for “intervention by the AU in member states under grave circumstances like war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity”. The AU established a body pursuant to Article 5(2) “other organ the Assembly may decide to establish” to deal with security in the region, continental peace and security architecture, which has come to be known as the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Juma M. (ed), 2006).

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The APSA is a term that is used to describe a set of AU structures cooperating with African sub-regional organizations for conflict prevention and resolution. The centre of APSA lie the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for which article 3 of the related Protocol sets out significant objectives in regard to the anticipation, prevention and resolution of conflicts in the continent of Africa (AU 2002, Article 3). The objectives states that it shall perform functions including promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, early Warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction is necessary by the provision of humanitarian action and disaster management which are important ingredients for development and integration on the continent Africa.

APSA incorporates all actors, hence getting ownership of African problems and crises (Vines, 2013; African Union, 2013). The APSA consists of such pillars as Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Peace Fund (PF) and the African Stand-by Force (ASF), Regional Mechanisms of the Regional Economic Communities (RM/REC).

Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The Peace and Security Council was launched in May 2004 to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa and serve as a standing decision-making organ for the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Protocol establishing the PSC in its guiding principle "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act", Article 2 (1) and (2) was established to be collective security and early warning arrangements to facilitate and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa and shall be supported by the Commission with other four pillars, a Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an Africa Standby Force (ASF) including the Military Staff Committee and a Special Fund (PSC Protocol Article 2 (2) Juma, M., 2006)). The PSC coordinates all the activities of the other institutions of the architecture and also builds relations with the United Nations Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee.

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is one of the pillars of APSA that supports and advises the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on stemming conflicts before it breaks out. The Panel is composed of five highly respected African personalities with outstanding contribution in peace, security and development (Article 11, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council of the African Union). The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), is another pillar of PSC, which consists of "the Situation Room" responsible for data collection and analyzing them on the basis of early warning indicators module; and observation monitoring unit of Regional Mechanism for data collection and transmitting the same to the Situation Room, and to collaborate with the United Nations. It also facilitates early action by PSC and Chair of the Commission (PSC Protocol Article 12). Military Staff Committee PSC composed of senior staff committee of defence, established to assist and advise the PSC in matters of military and security in Africa. (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 13(8)). Peace Fund comprises financial appropriations taken from the regular budget of the African Union, arrears of contribution, voluntary contributions from member states and other sources from outside Africa (Article 21 (2), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union).

Regional Mechanisms (RM) of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is part of the overall security architecture of the African Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. The Peace and Security Council and the chairperson of the African Union Commission are charged with harmonizing and coordinating activities of Regional Mechanisms in compliance with the objectives and principles of the AU (Protocol, Article 16, Mpyisi, 2009). Civil Society consists of Non-Governmental Organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations (particularly women's organizations) are encouraged to participate in the efforts to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council (Article 20, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002/2003).

African Standby Force (ASF)

African Standby Force (ASF) was established to enable Peace and Security Council in deployment of peace support mission's humanitarian assistance and intervention. The term 'standby' means that the ASF is not like a national army, not a standing force, but operates on a standby basis only but on arrangements constituted through pledges from AU member states and Regional Economic Communities(RECs) and Constituted through pledges from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and Regional Mechanism (RMs).

The functions of ASF include, among others, observation and monitoring of missions; other types of peace support mission; intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at request of a Member State to resort peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act; preventive deployment to prevent dispute or conflict from escalating; peace building ; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population and any other functions mandated by Peace and Security Council or the Assembly(Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002/2003), Article 13(3)). ASF is instituted on the basis of the pledges by member states and with co-ordination by Regional Economic Communities or Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The member states thus identify and earmark military, police and civilian personnel, and forward their names and details to their REC or RM. Based on the pledges, each REC/RM raises and prepares a regional force and develops a standby roster for the civilian and police components, and the military observers.

They then forward to the AU full data on the capabilities raised and the standby roster developed (Dersso, S., 2010). The ASF is composed of multidisciplinary contingents, civilians and military components of the country of origin, to be deployed by PSC and authorized by the African Union Assembly (PSC Protocol Article 13). African Standby Force (ASF) is therefore a creation borne out of the African's vision to address the endemic conflicts in the continent, with the aim of taking the lead in conflict resolution efforts in African countries that were experiencing conflicts.

The ASF and its *modus operandi*, that is, for each authorized mission shall be considered approved, in accordance to peace Support Operating Procedures (SOP); able to act on an AU or UN mandate to breach the gap between the eruption of violence or conflict and the deployment of UN forces. It is the responsibility of the AU to evaluate the readiness of the regional Plan Elm, HQ and ASF regional brigades in consultation with REC Planning Element (Plan Elms experts in communication, logistics, training, Information Technology). The role of the ASF is to provide Peacekeeping forces on a high level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN or the AU or a given region (IRSEM, 2011, AU, 2010).

The ASF is organised into five regional brigades such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIg); the North African Regional Capability (NARC) brigade, which is known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC), the East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) brigade, which is known as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The brigades were changed to standby forces as follows: the East African Standby Force (EASF); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SSF)(Casaba, et al., 2010).

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)

The Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) was established pursuant to the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2005 and is composed of brigade HQs, the Planning Element (PLANELM and the Logistic Base. The name 'EASBRIG' was later changed to the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), in the 6th Extraordinary Council Ministers meeting held in Nairobi Kenya, on 18 June 2010, so as to reflect the multi dimensionality(AU, 2009). The EASF is used in peacekeeping missions to respond to national emergencies. There are 8 Member States of EASF as follows: Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Rwanda.

These Member States agreed in 2004 that EASF was to operate on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on 11 April 2005, and entered into force on 11 May 2005 in accordance with article 14. According to the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism, the East African Stand by Force (EASF) was to go operational in November 2010 after the Standby Brigade, which was undergoing field training, as by the requirements set by the African Union. The Brigade involves specially trained troops from 11 member countries to complete its field training in November after which was to be certified as fully operational. However the countries around the Great Lakes region have been under the gush of civil conflicts that have left tens of thousands of people homeless or displaced as refugees in the DRC, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville and the Central African Republic The geographical groupings of West, East, North, Southern and Central Africa is applied for equal representation (Policy Framework for the Establishment of African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (part1)(2003)chapter 3.12(d Africa Peace Security Architecture (APSA)Source: Adopted from Ulrich Golaszinski, October 2004




Figure 1

Challenges of EASF

There are many challenges facing EASF which include among others the vagueness of the implementation of principles which established the ASF (IRSEM, 2011). The EASF is operating with a weak Legal Frame work because there is only an MOU and a Policy Framework which are not binding. There is mistrust among the states in the East Africa hence hampering the development to EASF. The AU and ASF undertook the largest deployment of AMISON, which was a failure because of various factors. The Somali in 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) militia took control of Mogadishu and Ethiopia then intervened to recover the capital and managed to restore the authority of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) established in 2004. The EASF faces another challenge in the East Africa where both Kenya and Ethiopia aspire to regional leadership, and this internal rivalry is evident by the way the EASF HQ is situated in Addis

Ababa while the Planning Element (Plan-Elm) is in Nairobi. The ASF is confronted by the problem of threat from piracy off the coast of Somalia, which causes insecurity in the continent (Cedric de Coning & Kasumba, Y., 2005, Hussein, M.A., 2012). Another challenge facing EASF is inability of Member States to commit forces because there is no binding arrangement between Member States for force deployment, which has led to a shortfall in regional contribution by the Member States. There is a lack of communication between the AU and the EASF as well as poor communications with the RECs in the region (IGAD, EAC and COMESA). There is also inadequate funding support in all EASF in their operations and rely heavily on foreign donors (Vines, A., 2013, Burgess, S., (undated). There is a security problem in the Sahel in that it does not fit into any of the six scenarios for ASF deployment (Observatoire De L'Afrique, 2009; Mpyisi, K., 2009)

Challenges of APSA

The overlapping mandates resulting from multiple demands from parallel mandates from AU and UN is a challenge to APSA. The AU is the mandating authority at continental level but peacekeeping capabilities and parallel is from the UN, however the implementation of the decisions by the UN Security Council takes long (IPI, AU & UN, 2010). The recommendations of the Brahimi Panel incorporate the UN System in peace and security that

“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”

The rationale for this view is that the relevant recommendations impose a higher premium on standards and capacities that, if met, will facilitate the full participation of African countries in UN peace operations, hence the Brahimi Panel's Report and Recommendations raise serious challenges to the AU in Regional peace support efforts in terms of organisation, equipment, training, operational doctrine, and capacities for mandate accomplishment, together with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), as well as for Quick Impact Projects (QIP) (AU 2003; Xuejun, W., (2012).

Hussein, M.A. (2012) noted that there is lack of institutional clarity and the confusion in the practices of AU peace operations, as was the case of the AMIS mandate which exposed the inefficiency of APSA. There is a challenge of institutional relations between the RECs, the AU and the UN with respect to authorizing and operationalising of peace operations in Africa; and lack of clarity in some of the RECs/RMs regarding their internal mandating authority. It is not even clear if RECs/RMs are developing a clearly defined decision making process for an ASF deployment. The Security Council in some instance has authorized a mission to be conducted under a regional body, the forces on the ground either are accountable to the UN or the regional organization, and in situations where both the UN forces and regional forces are both present on the ground, particularly during change over from regional to UN or vice versa, the designation of command relationships at times creates confusion and at times unrealistic (Hussein, M.A., 2012; IPI, AU&UN 2010).

There is a mismatch between the concept of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the nature of the actual tasks and challenges on the ground. The AU's missions are mainly deployed to crisis situations where there is no peace to keep and when they try to salvage the situation, they encounter a challenge from its own mandate of Peacekeeping mandates which cannot operate in peacemaking and peace-enforcement environment. The ASF is a conventional military multinational force, deployed by the member states for a period of six months to address the security issues in Africa however there is a gap between the ASF force structure and the nature of conflicts in Africa. For instance, the DRC is in the domain of SSR the experience is that different parts of the DRC's armed

forces are being trained by different states, according to different procedures. More generally, there are questions about the ability of the states and institutions to absorb the aid offered: some senior officials, in Addis and in capitals, spent much of their time simply receiving delegations offering advice and help (Hussein, M.A., 2012; IRSEM (2011)).

There is a disconnect between the AU PSC and similar organs in the RECs and also insufficient linkage between PDO Division and AU Commission or Peace and Security Council (PSC). For instance the AU in 2010, had no direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/and RMs. The AU has failed to enforce the election procedures and criteria and members in the regions elect representatives to the PSC according to regions their members as per regions irrespective of the AU election criteria and procedures, which AU fails to enforce. For instance, some regions have agreed to have one of their members occupy the three year seat almost on a permanent basis, hence establishing a pseudo-Permanent member and no veto powers (IPI, AU, UN, 2010; Hussein, M.A., 2012). APSA faces a challenge of minimal strategic direction, where critical vacancies at the strategic levels are not filled early enough during PKOs, and also the senior strategic leaders are not adequately trained and the roles of international partners are unclear. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) lacks the capacity to plan and guide the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic level because strategic goals are not properly articulated. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), for example, exposed gaps in the planning and guidance at the strategic level and the integration of the various components of the mission, such as the military, police, political, and humanitarian activities on the operational level. Some of the accusations include the concern that APSA in its coverage in the continent does not cover all existing and emerging security challenges (Kobbie, M, 2009; Mpyisi, 2009).

The Member States of AU APSA participate in peacekeeping mission for wrong motives and other self-interests. The external actors, such as China and the United States, are habitually present also, with their own agendas. Uganda, for instance, saw a good opportunity in deploying to Somalia so as to support the US anti-terrorism concerns, but Rwanda had an interest in Darfur it was motivated by its own experience of genocide, while other states join a mission to generate funds for their own armed forces and enrich themselves. Other countries, however, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda get engaged in missions so as to divert the attention of international from criticizing them over human rights violations. It has a negative impact on their reactions of such states, for example, when the UN pointed out that Uganda supports M23 rebels in the DRC, Uganda responded by threatening to withdraw its troop contributions to AU and UN missions in Africa. Kenyan forces in Somalia, renamed as AMISOM in 2012, helped in strengthening their military capacity, became legitimate and got financial and logistical support provided to AMISOM (De Conic, F., 2013; Hussein, M.A., 2010).

The ASPA encounters a shortage of both human and material resources. The AU over stretches its staff by overloading them with work, making them dissatisfied and having a feeling that they could earn more in the UN or in other private organizations and AU serves a standby place for gaining experience awaiting a better place for employment. There is also a tendency to rely on contract staff in key areas They have also noted for making unnecessary travels for allowance and are not able to complete their office work and overwhelmed by an ever-growing workload and often high turnover of qualified staff (Vines, A., 2013; Dersso 2010; Vorrath, J., 2012). There is also a problem that the relevant posts were occupied by staff from outside the AU's Peace Support Operations Department during these exercises (Vines, A., 2013; African Union).

The conflicts in the member countries involve excessive politicisation of identity, as well as high degree of internationalisation of the conflicts and extensive civilian involvement in the perpetration of atrocities. The AU suspended eight countries between 2003 and 2012, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, from its membership and 12 coups d'état took place in Africa, restricted to small

and medium-sized states (with the exception of Côte d'Ivoire). The AU sanctions its members by suspending them from the AU organization, which is aimed at stigmatizing them on the behaviour contrary to AU provisions, and seeks the support of other actors, such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or external bodies such as the UN or European Union. In December 2009 the PSC adopted the Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of Measures of the African Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

The AU has responded to coups, in only a few cases and has rarely acted against governments that have chosen to prolong their stay in power. This framework included the decision to create a sanctions committee at the AU in Addis Ababa, aimed at monitoring implementation of the PSC's sanctions policy the high-level structure of the AU and the APSA is not always supported, either by effective and cooperative sub-regional organisations, or by the practical and financial implementation of what has been agreed in Addis. (De Coninck, F., 2013; Hussein 2012; Observatoire De l'Afrique, 2009).

The conflicts in Africa after the Cold War were mainly intrastate and trans-national and rarely interstates however they overlapped the boundaries of the sub regions of the continent (Vines 2013) the five regions under PSC of the AU however do not correspond directly with the existing eight RECs. For example, East Africa has the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) have overlapping or different membership and none of the entities has a security element. For instance the responsibility for coordinating the East Africa Standby Force (EASF) whose membership is from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles and Uganda, was given to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); but Seychelles, Madagascar and Rwanda are not members of IGAD (AU, 2010; (Observatoire De L'Afrique, 2009; Vines,A., 2013). There is competition between RECs and the AU especially in terms of division of labour, rivalry over which should take the lead in the mediation, for instance in Madagascar, points to an ambiguity over who should take the lead in a political crisis the RECs and the complexity of the relationship between the AU, the RECs and individual nations (Mpyisi, K., (2009).

The APSA also faces other unprecedented threats from rebels who use small arms and light weapons organised crime, Al-Shabaab, Al Qaeda, piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa in Somalia, drug use and trafficking, water shortages and resource conflicts, among others. In some regions, trans-national organised crime has been a threat to the integrity of states themselves. For instance, the LRA has caused insecurity through abduction of children, maiming them, killing and other horrific activities in northern Uganda, South Sudan and in the forests of DRC, making the Members States to struggle to control their territories. Another challenge facing the ASF and the AU is the threat from criminals and rebel groups who possess illegal weapons for terrorizing the civilians, and are often better armed and equipped than the forces of these states (Potgieter, J., (2009); Vines, A., 2012).

According to Dersso S., (2012), the UN experience in Africa is that peacekeeping is a very expensive enterprise involving a lot of expenditure. For example, from July 2009 to June 2010 an estimated US\$5, 7 billion was to be spent on the seven UN missions in Africa. This implies that the UN spent an average of about US\$814 million on each of the missions and US\$475 million per month on peacekeeping operations in Africa. The AU's limited experience with AMIS and AMISOM which was a failure poses a challenge for AU to obtain funds and sustain peacekeeping mission (AU, IPI, and UN 2010). A set of roadmaps has guided the implementation of APSA. The first covered the period from 2005 to 2008 and guided infrastructure, doctrine, operating procedures and evaluation, the second was from 2008 to 2010, established political and legal mandates, rapid deployment concepts and planning capacities and ASF was to have become operational by 2010 but this target was not met. The third mandate began in 2011 and was scheduled to end in 2015.

Low numbers of African ambassadors attending the exercises also signalled a low level of political interest, and any deployment would depend on political agreements (Observatoire De L'Afrique, 2009; Vines, A., 2013).

The AU APSA has been found to be dysfunctional. The Audit panel of the African Union of 2007 and the 2010 assessment study, *Moving Africa forward: African Peace and Security Architecture* AU has been exposed the functioning of the Commission as a 'malfunctioning body', with overlapping portfolios, lines of authority, liability and lack of clearly define goals even after it had been in existence for some time. The PSC, the ASF, the CEWS and the advisory bodies are only partly functional because they heavily depend on the availability of external funding. This is because the AU Member States have failed to meet their financial obligations and contributed only 2 per cent to the Peace Fund for peace and security in the region, between 2008 and 2011 and the AU have had to depend on donor support for its programmes and other funds from foreign donors. In East Africa the number of officers who are seconded from the donor countries outnumbers the African counterparts (Escorrega, L. C. F., and (Maj) 2011).

This position of reliance on donors has weakened African Peace and security, where the ASF encounters the problem of capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. This means that most of the AU missions like the Somalia is funded by the EU and UN, leaving the question as to who really owns the AU legally because this undermines the African ownership. The missions exposes the infrastructure deficits since the AU, in the case of Somalia, was unable to deploy its troops on the ground which was identified as 'fundamental misconception, misunderstanding and misperception of what such partnerships entail, and what should be the guiding principles of this relationship' (Vines, 2013; Hussein, M.A., 2010; AU, 2012; Kwesi A., (2012 cited by AU 2012)).

In some cases co-ordination between the international actors has proved to be very difficult. In the case of the DRC, this is particularly clear in the domain of SSR. Different parts of the DRC's armed forces are being trained by different states, according to different procedures. More generally, there were questions about the ability of the states and institutions to absorb the aid offered: some senior officials, in Addis and in capitals, spent much of their time simply receiving delegations offering advice and help. The priorities and extent of the external funding (especially from the EU) are regularly decided for internal political reasons, without much reference to the situation on the ground: much of the money is therefore not spent (IRSEM (2011)).


CONCLUSIONS

There are several factors that suggest that Africa will continue to witness violent conflicts and serious political upheavals. This hampers the development of African continent. The first is the continued fragility or weakness of many states in Africa. This relates to the illegitimate origin of the African state, its corrupt and authoritarian systems of governance, the alienation of state structures and processes from the public, and the failure of state institutions to provide for the needs of citizens in any meaningful way. Other, related factors are the failure of the consolidation of democratic forms of governance in many parts of Africa and the decline of constitutionalism. Related to these two is the rise of political instability and Coups d'etat in many countries, as manifested in post-election conflicts in countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Lesotho and Ethiopia, The AU adopted the AU Constitutive Act in order to be to intervene in extreme circumstances and incidences like the events such as the Rwandan genocide is not to be repeated. APSA however may not solve all African problems.

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